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Abstract 
The contact the Africans had with the Europeans dated back to the 9th century, However, the European presence 
and penetration did not take place until the late 15th and the first-half of the 19th centuries respectively. The 
exploration was pioneered by the Dutch and the Portuguese and the British dominated the period. By the middle 
of the 19th century, the presence of the Europeans had started to gain momentum and thus threats to African 
kingdoms as well as chiefdoms. It was the situation that posed threats to the Sokoto Caliphate established by the 
Jihad of Uthman Dan Fodio in 1804. The British conquest and the peoples’ resistance is the thrust of the paper. It 
examines the weighty issues that surrounded the conquest of one of the most organised caliphate in the Western 
Sudan. The academic paper is presented in historical methodology adopting the interpretative approach.   
Keywords: British, Conquest, Resistance, Sokoto Caliphate. 
  
Introduction 
Between the 9th and 15th centuries contact had been established between West Africa and Western Europe as a 
result of the success of the Portuguese in pioneering the sea routes around the western bulge of the Sahara. With 
news of commercial opportunities, other Europeans (English, French and the Dutch) began to do regular 
business on West African waters. The development of plantation economies in the tropical lands of the Americas 
led to a steadily increasing demand for African labour, hence many Africans were shipped across the Atlantic. 
By the end of the 18th century, the effort to abolish export of slaves was in progress, hence the gradual 
introduction of the ‘legitimate trade’. During this period also, various European powers were undergoing 
industrial revolutions in their home countries. The need for expansion and acquisition of raw materials for 
industrial production became paramount equally. The abundance of these raw materials in tropical Africa 
increased the tempo for the struggle to secure a place in the ‘Sun’ (Africa).  
Before this time, the various European powers had already concluded arrangements for colonization of 
their specific areas of influence in the eighty odd years since the abolition of slave trade, by way of treaties, 
threat of war or war. Accordingly, the Berlin Conference of 1884-5 was merely an international recognition of 
these various colonizing European powers to move ahead. The gun-fire for the start of a race which two of the 
participants, France and Britain, had already been in training was the spark that was needed to set ablaze the 
powder keg situation. France was quick to resort to armed column in her areas of influence – Saint Luis, Dakar, 
Niger, Dahomey and Cameroun. Britain on the other hand, was still reluctant to take up arms. When she 
eventually did, between 1896 and 1900, it was a question of time, as Ashanti, Yorubaland, Benin, and Northern 
Nigeria (Sokoto Caliphate inclusive) fell prey to the attacks. The aim of this paper, therefore, is to see among 
other things the British interest in the area referred to as Sokoto Caliphate, the crises and conflicts that ensued, 
the resistance put up by the people and the eventual conquest of the caliphate.  
The old Northern Nigeria, as well as certain areas in present-day Niger Republic, was the scene of a 
violent and decisive revolution at the beginning of the 19th Century. The movement known variously as the 
Sokoto, the Fulani and the Uthman Dan Fodio Jihad marked a crucial turning point unprecedented in the history 
of the area. Over the ruins of the numerous polities of these vast areas of about 250,000sq miles, is established a 
new political organization – the Sokoto Caliphate – based primarily on Islamic law and values. Hausaland was 
the main theatre of the Sokoto revolution which had effects on the peoples of the Western and Central Sudan 
from the Senegal in the West to Lake Chad in the East and from the Sahel in the North to the boarders of the 
tropical rain forests in the South. All these areas of polities where the Jihad existed and spread constituted the 
area known as the Sokoto Caliphate.  
This paper discusses why and how the Caliphate met its enemy’s (the British) challenge the way it did 
and the Caliphate’s vehement resistance and the antagonism of the masses to British occupation. The last decade 
of the 19th century may be described as a “decade of trouble” for Sokoto Caliphate. This decade witnessed a 
decisive change in British policy towards the Sokoto Caliphate. Before this time, contacts between the Caliphate 
and the Europeans were few and infrequent. These contacts were established by European travelers, all of whom 
were practically British citizens or other nationals sponsored by the British government. Consequently when the 
scramble for territories in Africa began, British influence was among the most dominant in the Caliphate. 
Relations between the Caliphate and Europeans during this period of sporadic contacts were mainly commercial.  
British commercial establishment began with the founding of the Inland Commercial Company in 1833 
and the expedition which that company sent to the Niger-Benue confluence in that year. Thenceforth, British 
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enterprise within the Caliphate was confined to the Niger-Benue waterways. Nupe Emirate became the main 
base of British activities. By the 1870’s, the proliferation of the British companies which engaged in cut-throat 
competition had degenerated into a commercial war. This marked the beginning of a new phase in the relations 
between the Europeans and the Caliphate. This phase equally characterized the age of the European’s attempt to 
establish political control over the Caliphate. Rather than diminish, the gulf between the two sides progressively 
widened in subsequent years until it ended in a military clash. It was this development that ensued between the 
British on the one hand and the Caliphate in the period 1897 to 1903. Resistance as put forward by the Caliphate 
towards British conquest could be seen as active or passive-active confrontation in the sense of military 
confrontation and passive in the form of non-military confrontation.  
 
Nupe Emirate: Conquest and Resistance  
Nupe Emirate became the base of British activities during this period of study. By 1897, the activities of the 
British have become so pronounced that Nupe was conquered by the British. The British involvement in Nupe 
Emirate could be traced to the activities of the Royal Niger Company in the Niger-Benue confluence. By 1895, 
the Royal Niger Company assisted the Emir of Nupe to evacuate the military ports of the French in Borgu and 
Bida. Ironically, the Company did the ‘gesture’ to make way for its establishment of military posts in the areas of 
Jebba and Bajibo. This was a clear manifestation of the violation of the existing agreements between the Emir of 
Nupe and the Royal Niger Company. Therefore, war became imminent. Both sides only needed time to mobilize 
their forces.  
All the Nupe African pilots and canoe men working on ships and in the Royal Niger Company were 
commanded by the Emir, Abubakar, to leave the company’s service making sure that the company became 
paralyzed. This was to serve as a temporary measure of show of resentment to the British move. The Emir 
continued to re-enforce his forces as the British move to occupy his territory became more glaring. A force of an 
estimate of 10,000 men was put forward by the Emir in this direction. The hostility of Nupe Emirate to the 
British had been touched off by West African Frontiers Force survey parties sent to explore the region. The 
parties of Rt. Cols. Marland, Cole and Lt. Monchmason encountered considerable opposition from many villages 
and towns on their way. They therefore had to use Nupe which stationed a “marauding” force on their territory 
against the British ready to attack the W.A.F.F. station at Wushishi. With the British forces advanced by O’Neil 
and some troops, they started guerrilla warfare against Kontagora and Bida, defeating their patrols in many 
skirmishes. With the return of the W.A.F.F troops from Ashanti, a full scale attack by the British on Nupe 
Emirate, Kontagora and Bida was undertaken early in 1901.  
A total of ten officers, three non-commissioned officers (NCO’s), 323 other ranks, 3 maxim guns and 
two 75 mm guns were at the disposal of the British. The Emirate forces numbering about 10,000 were armed 
mostly with arrows and Dane guns. The emirate army charged fearlessly when the British replied with volley. 
Finally the issue was resolved in favour of the British.  
 
Ilorin Emirate: Conquest and Resistance    
It would be recalled that Ilorin polity during the closing years of the 19th century witnessed an increase in the 
power of the Baloguns and the degenerations of the emirs to mere puppets. The support given by the white men 
to the Emir to buttress his waning power divided authority in the Emirate by widening the gap between the Emir 
and his Balogun. The Baloguns, who enjoyed popular followership, became naturally identified with opposition 
to the influence of the whiten man. In fact, Ilorin was ill-placed to resist external attacks. The resistance to 
British occupation in the area took the form of simmering discontent and unrest which rendered the position of 
the British very precarious down to 1903. The Emir, Suleiman, appreciative of the boost of his power derived 
from British backing, accepted Lugard’s proclamation with gratitude.  
By 1900, the gulf between the Emir and the Baloguns became widespread. The Baloguns began to 
gather more strength in their bid to resist the British. Balogun Ajikobi and Balogun Alanamu unsuccessfully 
attempted to throw the resident and ten Civil Police officers out of the town in September 1900. Because of the 
strong resistance of Ilorin, Umar, the deposed and exiled Emir of Bauchi, was brought to Ilorin. By January 
1903, a letter came from the Sarkin Musulumi (Sultan) urging Ilorin to create disturbance to divert attention 
from Sokoto. During this time, W.A.F.F. from Lagos had already arrived because of the unrest. The Emir who 
was pro-British then refused the order. Fear of British reprisal facilitated occupation of Ilorin.  
The subtle but passive resistance in Ilorin was typical of the attitude of other Emirates over and above 
whatever military resistance they could exhibit. To the British, Ilorin resistance was more virulent than military 
confrontation which they could deal with. Commenting on the danger of underground resistance in Ilorin, Dyer, 
the Resident, wrote “I am obliged to confess that at one time, I was afraid that my first appointment under your 
Excellency would have been a failure and that I would have been forced to report my inability to keep the town 
in order or even remain in Ilorin”.  
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Adamawa: Conquest and Resistance      
Aside other Emirates, Adamawa was already feeling the pangs of European conquest. The Germans, determined 
to occupy 7/8 of the Emirate (her share) in 1898-99 sent forces against Tibati. The reigning Lamido, Amalamu, 
was taken prisoner and a relation of his was installed. In the event, Zubeiru, the Emir of Yola had an encounter 
with the British attempting to protect Yola from threats of Rabih. The British went ahead and established 
commercial interests in the area. Zubeiru resisted this move by the British. In Yola those who stood for 
resistance ultimately prevailed over those who upheld surrender. Zubeiru of course belonged to the resisting 
group.  
Yola’s hostility towards the British continued until the Emir forced the Royal Niger Company (RNC) at 
Yola to pull down its flag and quit the station. Zubeiru’s stand was that the British presence in the region should 
be curtailed. The Emir realizing this new development, threatened to drive the British army to the river. Yola’s 
force attacked the British troops, but could not beat a retreat as they equally resumed firing shells. However, 
Yola was overrun.   
 
 
Kano Emirate: Conquest and Resistance 
After the occupation of Zaria, the British invaded and occupied Kano. Unlike Zaria where there was little or no 
resistance, Kano gave a strong resistance. Her preparations for war were getting across to Fredrick Lord Lugard. 
The city started rebuilding her walls; the erections of her strong gates were completed. Towns in the Emirate, 
acting on instructions from Kano, similarly rebuilt their walls and re-dug the trenches surrounding them. Kano 
procured large quantities of arms from Tripoli merchants and run-away W.A.F.F. soldiers. The Arabs in Kano 
were equally ready to help the Emir in putting up resistance in the event of an attack.  
Lugard decided to attack Kano realizing that it had become an enemy. Lugard wrote ‘the lives of the 
men who are to the best of their ability doing the Emir’s work here and honestly working for the good of these 
people would not be safe…’ Lugard was right but the Emir was equally right. They were enemies, each anxious 
to protect his interest. In fact the welcome given to Magajin Keffi, at Kano was an excuse for war. As the British 
war fever increased, the Emir of Kano became relentless in his hostility. By 1902 he had made a proclamation 
forbidding caravans of traders from leaving Kano for the Southern Emirates as usual. He saw this move as a 
possible avenue for Northern Emirate Military Confederation which might turn out to be disastrous to the British 
officers. Armed with a lot of weapons,  Lugard decided to advance against Kano in the early years of 1903 with 
24 officers, 12 N.C.O’s, 2 medical officers and 722 rank and file made up of 550 foot, 71 artillery men and 101 
mounted infantry with four 75mm guns and four maxim guns.  
As part of Kano’s war plan, the Chief of Gaya, a town on the Zaria-Kano road, and all the head men of 
the towns had been instructed to resist European advance at Bebeji. These villages which had been fortified with 
a view to holding up the British advance were deserted at the approach of the British force led by Col. Morland. 
The mounted infantry in February 1903 exchanged shots with a Kano scouting patrol at a distance of 800 yards 
from the formidable walls. The walls had been marvelously constructed (30 to 50ft high) with a ditch running 
around them. The gates were a set of massive entrance towers about 50ft long and so tortuous that they could not 
be easily reached by shell fire. All these were aimed at resisting the British conquest of Sokoto Caliphate.  
The walls were reported to be strongly held by Kano soldiers as the British approached. With a series of 
gun fire, the gate and the wall could not be properly breached by gun fire as the entrance and the wall proved 
impervious to the gun fire of the British troops. The British forces later turned to the gate of the West i.e. Kabuga 
gate, where after a series of attacks, a breach was made in the gate. This broke the strong resistance hitherto 
posed by Kano. The British conquest of Kano became glaring as the Kano soldiers withdrew from the walls and 
fled. With estimated fighting force of Kano as 800 cavalry and 5,000 foot infantries, a lot of causalities were 
recorded.     
 
Sokoto Emirate: Conquest and Resistance 
The conquest of the Southern Emirate had further reduced the Caliphate’s potential for resistance. The real 
resistance and the defeat of the Caliphate would only be well understood after the fall of Sokoto. Obviously, 
occupation of Sokoto had been the ultimate goal of the British from the outset. The Royal Niger Company had 
attempted to install a Resident here. Equally, throughout the first-half of the 19th century, the reports getting to 
Lugard from interior about Kano and Sokoto served as pointers in his mind that a British advance on the 
Northern Emirate was imperative and to be undertaken with the least possible delay.  
Sokoto authority witnessed with apprehension the rivalry between the French and the Royal Niger 
Company in Borgu, Yauri and Nupeland in 1894-95. When the Company mounted its aggressive offensive-first 
against Bida and Ilorin in 1897, the Caliph would only send letters to the riverine Emirs asking them to expel the 
company from their territories. Underlying the passive nature of the Caliph’s hostility towards the Royal Niger 
Company in 1897, there was equally, the French’s threat by the establishment of military posts close to Gwandu 
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at Karim Illo and Gwamba. Finally, Goldie played up the fact that even though the Royal Niger Company 
invaded and defeated Bida and Ilorin, it neither replaced the local ruling dynasties nor stationed its troops in the 
capitals of those Emirates.  
By 1898, the Royal Niger Company had set a force towards Sokoto under the guise of helping the 
Sarkin Musulumi (Sultan) against the French. But the real aim of the Company was to establish an advanced 
military post near Sokoto and to get the Caliph to accept a British Resident in his capital. When tension mounted, 
the Sultan sent the Emir of Kontagora (at the head of a force of 7,000 horseman) to tell the British forces to go 
back or be attacked. By August 1898, the Company had established another military post at Illo. But the Caliph 
objected to it. The Sarkin Yawuri equally supported him. When the Royal Niger Company found the situation in 
Yelwa untenable, the military post was abandoned in September 1898. Shortly afterwards, the people of Illo in a 
popular uprising annihilated the whole of Illo garrison.  
The Sultan, Abdurrahman, never relaxed his hostility and resistance towards the British. By 1900, he 
had formally suspended relations between himself and the Royal Niger Company. With the suspension, Lugard 
sent his “Proclamation” to the Sultan. He rejected the British pretensions to sovereignty over the Caliphate and 
warned the British messenger to bring no more messages from them. By February 27, 1903, the British forces 
had converged in Kaura-Namoda. During this time, Sultan Attahiru was on throne. He tabled the matter of the 
impending British attack. There was the question of migration or peril as put by M.A. Al-Hajji. The Sultan and 
some of his men agreed from the abode of the infidels. No sooner had they started preparation, than the British 
forces came knocking. The Sultan caught unawares had to lead his people to put up resistance in the face of the 
combatant British troops.  
The British army with a strength of 25 officers 5 N.C.O.’, 2 medical officers and one medical N.C.O., 
68 gunners, 656 rank and file, 400 careers, 4 maxims and four 75mm guns, marched towards Sokoto en-routes 
Argungu, Shagari and Sokoto. Skirmishes took place between the patrol scouts of Sokoto and the British forces. 
Sokoto warriors were armed with spears, arrows and Dane guns. The Caliph commanded the front with Ibrahim, 
Sarkin Rabah and Muhammed Maiturare on the left and right flanks respectively. As the war progressed, the 
superior weapons of the British forces outweighed those of Sokoto forces; hence, the defeat of the latter.  
Emirates like Bauchi, Gombe and Zaria were equally conquered but the processes of these conquests 
were incomparable to Emirates like Kano and Sokoto in terms of resistance. The three Emirates of Bauchi, 
Gombe and Zaria, showed little or no resistance to British conquest. This does not suggest however that they did 
not resist per se but that the type of resistance put up was passive. This may be borne out of the fact that 
previously conquered Emirates, irrespective of their hostile resistance towards British conquest, still fell prey to 
the foreign power. Therefore, to resist the British then was futile.  
 
Conclusion  
The comparative ease with which Sokoto Caliphate fell to the British is understandable, judging from the hurried 
preparations of these Emirates to meet their enemy. The superior weapons of the enemy plus the experience the 
British forces had acquired before that war rendered the efforts of the Sokoto Caliphate forces futile. One could 
also note a case of fatal tactical blunder on the part of the Caliphate army in their bid to resist the British 
onslaught instead of the Emirate fighting behind the city walls and trenches that surrounded them.  
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